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Mikel v. Quin

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: January 19, 2023

Two foster children were removed from Foster Mother’s home after Foster Mother submitted adoption papers on allegations of emotional abuse. Foster Mother argued that the Department failed to give her notice or an opportunity to be heard before commencing the removal process. Foster Mother filed action in federal court against the Department and its employees in their official capacity seeking declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting the defendants from removing future foster children from her care and from assisting in the adoption of her two foster children. Foster Mother also sought two declaratory judgments, one establishing that the contract between the Department and its employees was void, and another stating a violation of Due Process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss.

The United States District Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that Tennessee’s sovereign immunity prevented Foster Mother’s suits against the Department. Foster Mother appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that sovereign immunity barred Foster Mother’s suit against the Department, but did not bar her suit against the department employees. The Court reasoned that sovereign immunity limits, but does not prohibit, lawsuits against state officials in their official capacity when the relief is “designed to end a continuing violation of federal law,” if the action does not seek a monetary recovery from the state. Because Foster Mother did not seek money damages and the state continued to deprive her of her foster children, the Court found that Foster Mother’s suit against the Department’s employees was not barred.

The Court next held that Foster Mother lacked standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief from the Department employees.

When a litigant seeks to remedy a procedural wrong, the litigant need only show “some possibility” that an injunction will afford redress. The Court found that Foster Mother’s proposed injunctions of prohibiting the defendants from removing future foster children from her and from assisting in the adoption of her two foster children did not have even “some possibility” of redressing her injuries. Foster Mother suffered a present, ongoing injury when she lost custody of her fostered children, but neither of the injunctions she proposed created a possibility that those children would be returned to her.

Because federal courts cannot issue advisory opinions, a declaratory judgment may only issue when it is “substantially likely” to redress an actual or imminent injury. The Court found that neither of Foster Mother’s proposed declaratory judgments were substantially likely to redress Foster Mother’s injuries. Stating that the employee’s contract with the Department was void nor a declaration of a violation of 42. U.S.C. § 1983 would not return the children to Foster Mother.

Finally, the Court held that Foster Mother lacked a liberty interest in the relationship with her foster children.

The Due Process Clause states that “no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Foster Mother did not claim a property interest in her two foster children. The Court held that Foster Mother did not have a liberty interest in her relationship with her two foster children. The Court reasoned the Supreme Court has explicitly declined to decide whether foster parents have liberty interests in their relationships with foster children, and that the Sixth Circuit has specifically held that “the foster care relationship” is a “temporary arrangement created by state and contractual agreements,” one which vested “’limited’ legal rights in the foster family.” Because Foster Mother took custody of her two foster children under contract with the Department her relationship with the children was a “temporary arrangement created by state and contractual agreements,” and she therefore lacked a constitutional liberty interest in her status as a foster parent.

Digested by Emily T. Cecconi