2024-CA-0412-MR
Jefferson Family Court
Kentucky Court of Appeals
Opinion by Judge Jones
Date Rendered: September 5, 2025
Question Presented: Whether the family court erred by imposing a child support obligation without making the required findings of a substantial and continuing material change in circumstances under KRS 403.213.
Husband and Wife married in 2020 and had one child together. In 2022, they divorced and entered into a Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) that granted joint custody, provided for a parenting schedule, and allocated financial responsibilities. The MSA expressly stated that no child support would be set at that time, though the parties agreed to share daycare expenses equally, divide uncovered medical and extracurricular costs, and required Husband to maintain insurance for Child. The family court incorporated the MSA into the divorce decree.
In October 2023, Wife moved the family court to establish child support. Husband opposed the motion, arguing that the MSA constituted a waiver of support and that no substantial change in circumstances justified modification. Wife responded that a shift from $0 to a guideline-based obligation created a statutory presumption of material change under KRS 403.213(2).
At a hearing in March 2024, both parties testified that their jobs, incomes, and parenting schedule had not materially changed. Wife argued Husband inconsistently reimbursed her for his share of expenses and had stopped making voluntary contributions. Husband insisted he remained compliant with the MSA. The family court nonetheless ordered Husband to pay $754 per month in support retroactive to November 2023, with an arrearage payment plan. The order did not reference any finding of a substantial and continuing material change in circumstances.
Husband appealed, arguing that the family court erred by imposing support without finding a substantial and continuing material change as required by KRS 403.213(1).
The Court of Appeals vacated the family court’s order and remanded for further proceedings, directing the court to apply the statutory presumption of material change under KRS 403.213(2) and determine whether Husband rebutted that presumption.
The Court of Appeals explained that the MSA, as incorporated into the divorce decree, was a “decree respecting child support” within the meaning of KRS 403.213, even though it set support at $0. Any subsequent request must therefore be treated as a motion to modify support, not an initial determination.
While the family court had authority to revisit support, it was required to make findings of a substantial and continuing material change. Under KRS 403.213(2), the application of the child support guidelines resulting in a 15% or greater change from the existing obligation creates a rebuttable presumption of material change. Moving from $0 to a guideline-based amount easily satisfied this threshold, consistent with the Kentucky Court of Appeals’ published decision in Nelson v. Ecklar, which controls over older unpublished cases such as Thomas v. Thomas.
However, the presumption is not conclusive. Husband was entitled to attempt to rebut it by showing that the apparent increase did not reflect a true material change. Because the family court treated Wife’s motion as though no prior decree existed and failed to analyze whether the presumption had been rebutted, the order was deficient. The Court vacated the order and remanded for a supplemental hearing and findings of fact.
Digested by Nathan R. Hardymon