2023-SC-0156-DG
Jefferson Circuit Court
Kentucky Supreme Court
Opinion by Justice Nickell
Date Rendered: December 19, 2024
Issues: Whether order lacking CR 54.02 finality language is final when all issues are resolved.
Whether the Court of Appeals can sanction litigants without notice or a hearing.
Bruenger (ex-wife of deceased) and Miller (daughter of deceased) were in a lengthy dispute involving life insurance benefits. After a hearing, the Circuit Court entered an order on December 9, 2020, which concluded that there was no remedy available to Bruenger. The Circuit Court then held a status conference to determine if any claims remained pending. The finality of the December 9 order was discussed at the status conference. The Court was unsure about finality and requested Bruenger address the issue and ask that any remaining claims be ruled upon. On March 3, 2021, Bruenger asked the Court to mark the December 9 order as final and did not include any request for a ruling on any additional claims. Miller maintained that the December 9 order was final regardless of the finality language.
Bruenger appealed, Miller moved to dismiss, and the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely. Bruenger requested discretionary review which was denied. Bruenger then sought relief pursuant to CR 60.02 from the Circuit Court requesting the court vacate and re-issue its judgment to restore her right to appeal. The relief was granted and Bruenger again appealed. The parties moved forward on the merits of the appeal, but the Court of Appeals sua sponte dismissed the appeal and awarded Miller attorney fees. Bruenger moved for discretionary review which was granted.
The Supreme Court holds that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the CR 60.02 issue because the CR 60.02 issue was “collateral to the merits of the appeal.” The Court of Appeals always has jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court turns to Bruenger’s argument that RAP 11 is inapplicable or does not authorize the award of attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court holds that the Court of Appeals properly awarded attorney’s fees pursuant to RAP 11 as a monetary sanction for the filing of a frivolous appeal but observes that the Court of Appeals should have set the amount of attorney’s fees or remanded to the trial court to set the amount. However, the Supreme Court goes on to hold that the attorney’s fee sanctions were imposed in violation of Bruenger’s due process rights, as she did not have notice or the opportunity to be heard on the sanctions. While the Court of Appeals need not hold a full evidentiary hearing, Bruenger was entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before the sanctions were issued; thus, the Supreme Court reverses the sanctions of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court goes on to reiterate that the dismissal of the appeal was proper as CR 60.02 cannot be used as a mechanism to grant relief for a mistake of law.
Justice Bisig concurs in part and dissents in part arguing the frivolous nature of the appeal was within the personal knowledge of the Court of Appeals, and thus, no hearing or notice should be necessary.
Digested by Elizabeth M. Howell