No. 2023-CA-1091-MR
Fayette Family Court
Opinion by Judge Eckerle
Dated Rendered: June 28, 2024
In this case, Father appeals a decision by the Fayette Family Court, which granted Mother the authority to make educational and religious decisions for their children, despite the terms of their separation agreement. The agreement had originally granted joint custody and stipulated that the children would attend Lexington Christian Academy (LCA) through Grade 12, with Father responsible for tuition. However, after obtaining a Domestic Violence Order (DVO) against Father in 2022, which gave her temporary sole custody, Mother sought to change the children’s school, citing logistical challenges and the children’s wishes.
Father opposed the change, arguing that the separation agreement’s provision requiring LCA attendance was not subject to modification. However, the Family Court ruled without a hearing that Mother had the unilateral authority to make this decision due to her temporary custody. The Family Court also did not consider mediation as required by the agreement. Father appealed, and the Court of Appeals concluded that while educational and religious decisions are related to custody, they are not solely controlled by it. The Court of Appeals found that the Family Court erred in allowing Mother to change schools without a hearing or findings of fact and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if there are grounds to modify the custodial terms.
The analysis centers on whether the agreement regarding the children’s attendance at LCA remains enforceable despite Mother having temporary sole custody due to a DVO. The Court of Appeals ruled that typically, sole custody allows the custodial parent to make decisions about a child’s education and upbringing. However, since both parents had previously agreed in their separation agreement that the children would attend LCA, the Court of Appeals found that this agreement was still relevant and should not be overridden without due process.
Father argued that this provision should only be modified upon evidence of significant changes in circumstances, as the agreement was binding under Kentucky law unless it became unconscionable. Mother contended that her temporary custodial status allowed her to make such decisions unilaterally, but the court concluded that such decisions, particularly regarding education and religious upbringing, are inherently tied to custody and require a formal modification process.
The Court of Appeals further emphasized that the Family Court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing to assess whether changing the children’s school was in their best interests, as required by KRS 403.340. Since no such hearing was held, and no factual findings were made, the Court of Appeals reversed the Family Court’s decision to allow Mother to unilaterally change the children’s school. The case was remanded for further proceedings, including a proper hearing to determine whether modifying the agreement was warranted. The court also noted that DVOs should not be used to unilaterally alter major custodial agreements without sufficient grounds.
Digested by Nathan R. Hardymon