DVO Protection Extended to Partner’s Children

Question Presented: (1) Whether the family court erred in allowing petition for order of protection to proceed on behalf of Mohamed’s minor children; (2) whether the family court improperly admitted evidence of Pennie’s alleged history of domestic violence and protective orders involving third parties; and (3) whether the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that domestic violence occurred and may occur again.

In September 2024, LaBrea Mohamed filed a petition for an order of protection on behalf of herself and her two minor children against Demetrius Pennie. She alleged that Pennie twice struck her two-year-old son, once causing him to cry, and once during play with Pennie’s daughter. She also alleged Pennie arrived at her home unannounced, retrieved a firearm he kept there, and disassembled and reassembled it in front of her son despite her repeated requests for him to leave. Mohamed testified that Pennie’s temper and verbal abuse escalated after she became pregnant with his child, and that she feared his conduct would worsen. Pennie denied the abuse, denied hitting the child, and claimed he only used gentle parenting.

The Jefferson Family Court entered an Emergency Protective Order in September 2024 and held a hearing in November 2024. After hearing testimony from both parties, and with a Guardian ad Litem representing the children, the family court found Mohamed more credible and concluded that Pennie had committed acts of domestic violence against Mohamed and her son. It issued a Domestic Violence Order restraining Pennie from further abuse or contact with Mohamed and her children for one year. Pennie appealed, arguing that the children were not covered under the domestic violence statutes, that certain evidence was improperly admitted, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the DVO.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the DVO. It held that the petition on behalf of the children was proper, that the evidentiary rulings did not constitute reversible error, and that the evidence supported the finding of domestic violence under Kentucky law.

On the first issue, the Court found substantial evidence that Pennie lived with Mohamed and her children at least on a temporary basis, leaving belongings at her home, possessing a key, and spending nights there when the children were present. Because Pennie and Mohamed were also expecting a child together, the Court held that they met the statutory definition of “members of an unmarried couple,” bringing Mohamed’s children within the statute’s protections. Kentucky’s domestic violence laws are to be construed broadly to protect victims, and therefore the petition on behalf of the children was valid.

On the evidentiary issue, the Court emphasized that the family court excluded hearsay statements about Pennie’s alleged violence toward others and considered any references to prior protective orders only for the limited purpose of Mohamed’s state of mind. Importantly, the written findings did not rely on that evidence but were based on the testimony about Pennie’s direct conduct toward Mohamed and her son. Any admission of extraneous evidence was harmless.

On the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court pointed to the family court’s findings that Pennie twice hit Mohamed’s son, once causing him to cry. This constituted physical injury, meeting the statutory definition of domestic violence. Even without physical contact, Pennie’s conduct with the firearm and refusal to leave the home reasonably caused Mohamed to fear imminent physical harm. The family court was entitled to credit Mohamed’s testimony over Pennie’s, and its findings were supported by substantial evidence.

Digested by Nathan R. Hardymon